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Abstract
We provide a model of dynamic duopoly in which rms face nancial constraints and dissa-
pear when they are unable to fulll them. We show that, in some cases, Cournot outputs are no
longer supported in equilibrium, because if these outputs were set, a rm may have incentives
to ruin the other. In these cases, standard grim-trigger strategies in which collusion is sustained
by innite reversion to Cournot outputs cannot be used. We show that there is a stationary
Markov equilibrium in mixed strategies where predation occurs with a positive probability. We
also obtain a modied folk theorem. We show that any bankruptcy-free outputs (outputs
in which no rm can drive another rm to bankruptcy without becoming bankrupt itself) that
attain individually rational prots (reecting bankruptcy consideration) can be supported by a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when rms are su¢ ciently long-sighted.
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1. Introduction
There is ample evidence that nancial constraints play an important role in the behavior of rms
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). We begin with the observation that the
punishment for violation of a nancial constraint must be severe or otherwise rms would default
all the time. Suppose that the punishment is so severe that rms violating nancial constraints
lose the capacity to compete and disappear (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990).1 Firms might then
have incentives to take actions that would make it impossible for competitors to fulll nancial
constraints in the hope of getting rid of them.
In this paper we provide a model of dynamic duopoly in which both rms take fully into account
the nancial constraints of the other rm as well as their own nancial constraints. To simplify
our task we make two assumptions: Prots cannot be transferred from one period to the next
and the nancial constraint requires that prots must be non-negative in each period. The second
assumption entails just a normalization of prots. However, the rst assumption is not innocuous
and is discussed later on.
We introduce the concept of bankruptcy-free outputs (BF hereinafter). This is the set of outputs
in which prots for all rms are non-negative (so no rm goes bankrupt) and no rm can make the
other rm bankrupt without becoming bankrupt. The concept of BF captures the opportunities
for ruining other rms that exist in our set up, while they are not captured by standard concepts
such as Cournot equilibrium. Importantly, we show that Cournot equilibrium may not be BF.
Consider a market with constant returns to scale but di¤erent marginal costs. If marginal costs
are not signicantly di¤erent, both rms produce positive outputs in Cournot equilibrium. These
outputs are not BF because the most e¢ cient rm can produce an output (larger than its Cournot
output) for which the market price becomes strictly lower than the competitors average cost but
larger than its own average cost. As a result, the e¢ cient rm earns a positive prot while the other
rm incurs a negative prot and goes bankrupt. Why a rm would make such a move? Because
in a dynamic game this move gets rid of a competitor so if the e¢ cient rm is very patient this
move will pay o¤ in the future. This story suggests that the commonly used constant-marginal-cost
Cournot model might be misleading if rms have di¤erent marginal costs and nancial constraints
1Even though rms can be reorganized after bankruptcy and continue business, the survival rate of rms after
bankruptcy is typically low, 18% US, 20% in UK and 6% in France, see Couwenberg (2001).
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are relevant. In fact, the introduction of nancial constraints implies that monopolization (by the
e¢ cient rm) occurs with positive probability in a competitive equilibrium as we explain shortly.
When nancial constraints are considered, the grim-trigger strategies may not work because
reversion to Cournot outputs does not guarantee that rms have incentives to stay there. More
strikingly, tacit collusion cannot be supported in general by the grim-trigger strategies even if rms
are su¢ ciently patient, which is in a sharp contrast with the standard collusion analysis. We
consider a more general concept, namely stationary Markovian equilibrium, a dynamic equilibrium
in which rmsoutputs depend only on states, not on the detailed history. Let the state of each
period be the set of active rms, i.e., the rms that have not been bankrupted until that period. The
unique Markovian equilibrium in pure strategies, if it exists, is the Cournot equilibrium. However,
as we argued above, Cournot equilibrium may fail to be an (Markovian) equilibrium. Therefore, in
these cases, each stationary Markovian equilibrium must entail mixed strategies. We show that such
equilibrium exists. Assuming constant average costs and concave prot functions we characterize
the support of this equilibrium. Precisely, when discount factor is larger than certain cut-o¤ value,
the equilibrium in mixed strategies is the unique Markovian equilibrium and it has the following
properties: i) the rm with larger average costs, called the inferior rm from now on, never takes an
output larger than the one that maximizes per period prots, ii) the inferior rm becomes bankrupt
with positive probability (so monopolization occurs with positive probability), and iii) the support
of each rms mixed strategy contains exactly one interval with a unique mass point. Moreover,
for each rm the mass point coincides with the best reply of the static game (to the other rms
mixed strategy). For the rm with smaller average costs, called the superior rm, the mass point
is isolated and lies strictly below the interval support. Since the superior rm would not produce a
larger output than the best reply unless bankruptcy occurs, outputs in the interval support reect
the predatory activities of the superior rm. For the inferior rm, the mass point lies weakly above
the interval. This reects that the possibility of bankruptcy makes the inferior rm prudent when
choosing outputs.
The failure of the standard grim-trigger strategies does not necessarily imply that collusion is
not sustainable as an equilibrium. Firms may maintain collusion by employing other self-enforcing
punishments rather than reverting to Cournot outputs. The celebrated folk theorem shows
that any feasible and individually rational prots can be supported by a Subgame Perfect Nash
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Equilibrium (SPNE) when rms are fully patient (i.e., their discount factors are close to 1). Our
interest is whether a similar characterization can be obtained when bankruptcy considerations are
introduced.
We show that the folk theorem remains to be valid in our environment, once the set of feasible
and individually rational prots are appropriately modied. In the original folk theorem (without
bankruptcy consideration), each rms prot becomes individually rational if it exceeds a minimax
value, i.e., the minimum prot that a rm can guarantee itself even though the opponent takes
the severest output, and this becomes zero in our duopoly model. Therefore, any combination of
feasible and positive prots can be sustained by an equilibrium. The modication of feasibility is
straightforward. Instead of considering all possible prots, we should focus only on BF outputs,
since at least one rm has an incentive to ruin the other if the output is not BF. The modication
of the individual rationality condition comes from the fact that under nancial constraints, rms
that take severe punishments may become bankrupt as a consequence of their own action. To
avoid such scenario, we dene a new concept called the minimax BF value where minimization and
maximization are taken over only BF outputs.2 Then, we establish the modied folk theorem that
reects bankruptcy consideration. Namely, we show that any BF output prole that gives prots
greater than the minimax BF value can be supported as an SPNE and that prots less than the
minimax BF value cannot be sustained in any SPNE for a discount factor close to 1.
We end this introduction with a preliminary discussion of the literature (see more on this in the
nal section). Although a number of papers demonstrate that the nancial structure does a¤ect
market outcomes in an oligopoly, most previous studies adopt either static or two-stage models.
There are at least two exceptions, Spagnolo (2000) and Kawakami and Yoshida (1997). Both
papers make use of repeated games like ours. The former examines the role of stock options in
repeated Cournot games. In his model, unlike standard repeated games, rms do not necessarily
maximize average discounted prots because stock options a¤ect managersincentives. Taking this
e¤ect into consideration, Spagnolo (2000) shows that collusion becomes easier to achieve. In our
model, by contrast, collusion becomes more di¢ cult to support, at least when rms adopt the
grim-trigger strategies. The latter incorporates a simple exit constraint into the repeated prisoners
dilemma. In their model, each rm must exit from the market no matter how it plays if the rival
2For technical reasons we assume here that average costs are increasing.
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deviates over certain number of periods, and hence no output prole can be bankruptcy free. They
show that predations inevitably occur when bankruptcy constraints are asymmetric and rms are
long-sighted.
Finally, our approach might provide support to the notion that rms may engage in predatory
activities when pursuing prot maximization. Standard explanations of this behavior are based
on incomplete information (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), the learning curve (Cabral and Riordan,
1994) or rms playing an attrition game (Roth, 1996). In our model, rms have complete in-
formation, the technology is xed and rms play standard quantity-setting games. Nevertheless,
we obtain predation as a competitive equilibrium in mixed strategies. More importantly, both
predation and tacit collusion can be derived (as di¤erent equilibria) in a single model, which is a
completely new result to the best of our knowledge.
2. The model and preliminary results
Two rms compete in an innite number of periods. In each period rms simultaneously choose
quantities. Firms produce an homogeneous product. In order to focus in the strategic decisions
regarding outputs we assume that rms cannot accumulate prots. Firms become bankrupt if
they su¤er losses in a period. A bankrupt rm exits the market (i.e., produceszero every period
thereafter). When making its quantity decision in a period, each rm knows what any rm has
produced in all previous periods and which rms became bankrupt. The equilibrium concept that
we use is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). The formal denitions are given in Section
4. In the rest of this section we present the elements of the game that is played in each period. For
simplicity, the time dimension is not considered yet.
We refer to one of the rms as the superior (S) and the other as the inferior (I). Let j 2 fI; Sg
denote a rm and xj 2 R+ the output of rm j: Let Ci(xi) denote the cost function. Assume
that for all output, x, ACS(x)  ACI(x), where ACj(:) is rm js average-cost schedule. Assume
that average cost is nondecreasing and twice di¤erentiable. Let x = (xS ; xI) denote an output
prole, and let X = xS + xI be the aggregate output. Let p(X) be the inverse demand function
assumed to be strictly decreasing in X for any positive price and twice di¤erentiable. Derivatives
are denoted by primes, i.e. p0(X) is the slope of the inverse demand at X, etc. Prots for rm i
are i  p(X)xi  Ci(xi); and written as i(x) or as i(xi; xj). We assume the classical conditions
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that guarantee existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium namely, for all x = (xS ; xI);
p00(X)xi + p0(X) < 0; for all i 2 fS; Ig; (2.1)
p0(X)  C 00i (xi) < 0; for all i 2 fS; Ig: (2.2)
These conditions are satised if, for example, demand is linear and cost functions are quadratic.
We denote by xC = (xCS ; x
C
I ) the Cournot output prole and by 
C
i rm is payo¤ at the
Cournot output prole.
Central to the analysis of our dynamic set up is the concept of bankruptcy-free (BF) output
proles. This is the set of output proles in which no rm makes negative prot and no rm
can drive another rm into bankruptcy without bankrupting itself. A motivation to focus on such
outputs is that they describe a long run equilibrium in an industry in which all rms have incentives
to stay in the market and not to engage in predatory activities. Of course these activities might
be important but we look at the industry once the dust has settled and the predatory activities (if
any) have been done in the past. Formally,
Denition 1. An output prole x^ = (x^S ; x^I) is Bankruptcy-Free (BF) if:
a) i(x^)  0; for all i 2 fS; Ig.
b) i(x^i; x)  0 for any x such that j(x; x^i)  0:
Note that if rm i is required to make some prot vi (it could be either positive or negative) to
avoid bankruptcy, we can dene a new prot function as ~i(x)  i(x)  vi and redene BF with
respect to this new prot function.
Next we characterize the BF output proles. The characterizations will become important for
the analysis of the dynamic game.
Lemma 1. An output prole x = (xI ; xS) is BF if and only if, for both j, j(x)  0 and
ACj(xj)  ACk(D(ACj(xj))  xj); for all j such that xj 6= 0; (2.3)
where D(:) is aggregate demand and k 6= j.
Proof. The requirement j(x)  0 for both j follows from the denition of BF. If x^ > x^0, then
j(xj ; x^
0) < 0 entails j(xj ; x^) < 0. First note that, if a rm is not producing any output, this rm
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can not be driven to bankruptcy. Thus, consider a rm j such that xj 6= 0; and let us see when the
other rm k can drive rm j to bankruptcy. Dene
x(xj) = inffx 2 R+=j(xj ; x) < 0g: (2.4)
By continuity j(xj ; x(xj)) = 0. It follows that
p(xj + x(xj)) = ACj(xj) =) x(xj) = D(ACj(xj))  xj : (2.5)
It follows that rm k can drive rm j to bankruptcy without bankrupting itself if and only if
0  p(xj + x^k) ACk(x^k) < p(xj + x) ACk(x) = ACj(xj) ACk(D(ACj(xj))  xj) (2.6)
for some x^k > x(xj). But (2.6) can hold if and only if (2.3) does not.
Corollary 1. If the average cost is constant for both rms, ACj(x) = cj ; j 2 fI; Sg; and cS < cI
no output prole with both rms active is BF. In a BF output prole only the superior rm is
producing.
Proposition 1. Suppose x = (xI ; xS) is BF. Then, any combinations of outputs smaller than x,
i.e., x0 = (x0I ; x
0
S) such that x
0
I  xI and x0S  xS , must be BF.
Proof. Because demand curves slope down and average cost is nondecreasing, D(ACj(xj)) 
D(ACj(xj 0)) for xj  xj 0. This establishes the chain:
0  ACk(D(ACj(xj))  xj) ACj(xj)  ACk(D(ACj(x0j))  xj 0) ACj(xj 0): (2.7)
It follows, from Lemma 1 that x0 is BF.
A useful characterization of the BF set can be provided under the following additional assump-
tion.
Assumption 1. Both rms have increasing average cost, and there is a unique x = (xS ; xI)
with xi 6= 0 for all i 2 fS; Ig such that i(x) = 0 for all i 2 fS; Ig:
Assumption 1 always holds if for example demand is linear and Ci(xi) = ix
2
i with i > 0:
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds: Then the set of BF output proles is:
BF = f(xS ; xI) j 0  xi  xi for i 2 fS; Igg: (2.8)
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Proof. Note rst that, trivially, x = (xS ; xI) is BF. By Proposition 1, all x < x are also BF:
We can see that no other output prole can be BF. Let (xS ; xI) be an output prole such that both
rms have non-negative prots, and suppose that xI > xI . Let us see that rm S; by increasing
its output, can drive rm I into bankruptcy keeping positive prots for itself. Let x^S be such that
x^S + xI = xS + xI ; since xI > xI ; x^S < xS ; thus, at (x^S ; xI) rm S has positive prots. But since
average cost is increasing and xI > xI ; rm I at (x^S ; xI) becomes bankrupt.
To close this section, we see under which conditions Cournot output prole is BF in the
particular case of linear demand, p(xS +xI) = A xS  xI ; and cost, CS(x) = Sx2; CI(x) = Ix2
with 0 < S  I : By Lemma 2 the BF set is completely characterized by the output prole
x = (xS ; xI) such that ACI(xI) = ACS(xS) = p(xS + xI); thus, S xS = I xI = A  xS   xI :
xS =
IA
(1 + S)(1 + I)  1
; xI =
SA
(1 + S)(1 + I)  1
: (2.9)
The Cournot equilibrium is given by
xCS =
(1 + 2I)A
4(1 + I)(1 + S)  1
: (2.10)
xCI =
(1 + 2S)A
4(1 + I)(1 + S)  1
(2.11)
For the superior rm is always the case that xCS  xS : For the inferior rm, xCI  xI if and only if
(1 + I)(1  2S)  1: (2.12)
Thus, the Cournot equilibrium is BF if and only if condition (2.12) holds.
Finally, note that the joint prot maximization output, xJ = (xJS ; x
J
I ); is always BF because
marginal cost for both rms has to be equal, Sx
J
S = Ix
J
I ; and prots are non-negative for both
rms. Thus, trivially xJj  xj for all j 2 fS; Ig:
3. Dynamic Competition with Bankruptcy
In this section we focus on the dynamic model.
In each period t each rm i 2 fI; Sg chooses an output denoted by xti: Let xt = (xtI ; xtS) be a
prole of outputs in period t. The prots obtained by rm i in period t are i(xt) t = 0; 1; ::::;  ; ::We
dene a state at t as the set of rms that did not fall into bankruptcy in previous periods called
active rms. Let  2 (0; 1) be the common discount factor. Discounted prots for rm i are i =
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P1
t=0 
ti(x
t). The continuation payo¤ in period t is given by ti =
P1
r=0 
ri(x
t+r). At period 0
the game begins with the null history h0: For t  1; a history, denoted by ht = (x0;x1; ::;xt 1), is
a list all outputs at all periods before t: A strategy for rm i; i; (pure or mixed) is a sequence of
maps, one for each period t; mapping all possible period t histories into a probability distribution
in outputs. Let  = (I ; S) denote a strategy prole (pure or mixed). A Markovian strategy
for rm i is a mapping from the set of active rms into a probability distribution on outputs. A
Nash Equilibrium (NE hereinafter) is a collection of strategies from which no rm nds it protable
to deviate. A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE hereinafter) is a collection of strategies
which are a NE in every possible subgame. A stationary Markovian SPNE is a SPNE in which
rms use stationary Markovian strategies only. To ease notation whenever no confusion can arise,
we drop the time superindex.
In innite repeated games without bankruptcy considerations there is only one state, and hence
the stationary Markovian strategy (in the stationary Markovian SPNE) exactly coincides with the
Cournot output. In those games, collusive outcomes can be supported as a SPNE using grim-trigger
strategies in which any deviation from collusion triggers a switch to the Cournot outcome forever.
Under bankruptcy considerations, when the Cournot output prole is BF, the unique stationary
Markovian equilibrium is that both rms produce the Cournot outcome when both are active and,
when only one rm is active, this rm produces the monopoly outcome. In equilibrium both rms
are active in every period. It is not di¢ cult to see that, in this case, the collusive outputs that can
be supported without bankruptcy considerations by grim-trigger strategies, can be also supported
with bankruptcy considerations. Formally, the outputs (xi; xj) that can be supported for a given 
without bankruptcy considerations are those that satisfy:
i(xi; xj)  (1  )i(Bi(xj); xj) + Ci ; (3.1)
where Bi(xj) = argmaxi(xi; xj): Given that i(xi; xj)  i(Bi(xj); xj);
i(Bi(xj); xj)  Ci : (3.2)
Since i(Bi(xj); xj) is decreasing in xj and Ci = i(Bi(x
C
j ); x
C
j ); the above inequality implies that
xj  xCj . Thus, the quantities produced at those collusive outputs are smaller than at Cournot
outputs and by Proposition 1, if Cournot is BF, all these output proles are BF.
A di¤erent analysis has to be made when the Cournot outcome prole is not BF because it
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could be the case that for some discounts factors one rm may have incentives to bankrupt the
other rm.3 In the following Lemma we provide the range of the discount factor that is needed in
order to prevent such a deviation.
Lemma 3. Suppose that (xCS ; x
C
I ) is not BF. Then, there exists  < 1 such that the stationary
Markov strategy xi = xCi ; i 2 fI; Sg in the state with all rms active, and xi = xMi in states where
only rm i is active constitutes a stationary Markovian SPNE if and only if   .
Proof. Deviations in states at which only one rm is active are not protable because the
active rm is producing the monopoly outcome and the other rm is out of the market. Thus,
only deviations at states with both rms active are possible. Note that if both rms are active
and produce Cournot outputs, prots for rm i are Ci =(1   ). Given that the Cournot output
prole is not BF, a potential protable deviation is such that one rm drives the other to bankruptcy
without bankrupting itself. The discounted prots for this move are Di +
M
i (1 ); where Mi are
monopoly prots and Di are prots in the deviation for rm i: Firm i drives rm j to bankruptcy
by producing an outcome x^i > x(xCj ); where x(x
C
j ) is such that j(x
C
j ; x(x
C
j )) = 0: Given that
j(x
C
j ; x
C
i )  0; x(xCj )  xCi ; and therefore, for all x^i > x(xCj ); i(x^i; xCj ) < i(x(xCj ); xCj ): Thus,
driving rm j to bankruptcy is not a protable deviation for rm i if and only if
Ci  (1  )i(x(xCj ); xCj ) + Mi : (3.3)
For  ' 0 the right hand side of 3.3 is approximately i(x(xCj ); xCj ), and then the inequality holds
because Ci  i(x(xCj ); xCj ): For  ' 1 the right hand side of 3.3 is approximately Mi ; and the
inequality does not hold because Ci < 
M
i : Since the right hand side of 3.3 is decreasing in ; by
the intermediate value theorem there is i such that 
C
i  (1  )i(x(xCj ); xCj ) + Mi if and only
if   i: In conclusion, by taking  = minfigi2fI;Sg; we get the result.
In order to grasp the implications of bankruptcy considerations, we start by analyzing the case
of linear demand and constant marginal cost. We also assume that at Cournot equilibrium both
rms are active.
As we have shown in Lemma 3, even though the Cournot output is not BF; for    rm S
does not have incentives to bankrupt rm I: In the next proposition we show that if rm S does
3Recall that if rms have constant marginal costs, the Cournot outcome is BF if (i) costs are identical or (ii) they
are su¢ ciently di¤erent so that only one rm produces in equilibrium. In cases where costs are di¤erent, but not
quite, the Cournot outcome is not BF and therefore, for some discount factors, it is not an equilibrium.
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not have incentives to predate at Cournot outputs, it does not have incentives to predate at any
collusive output supported by triggering with the Cournot outcome forever without bankruptcy
considerations. The intuition behind this is that in all those collusive outcomes, rms produce less
than under Cournot. And since the cost of bankrupting a rm in the collusive output is larger
than in the Cournot outputs, if bankruptcy was not protable for the superior rm in the Cournot
outputs, it is not protable under collusion. Before formally introduce the proposition, we need
the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose that a collusive outcome x = (xI ; xS) is supported by the grim-trigger strate-
gies under bankruptcy consideration for some   . Then, x can also be supported by the
grim-trigger strategies without bankruptcy consideration for the same .
Proof. Since the punishment phase (repeated production of the Cournot outcomes) constitutes
a SPNE without bankruptcy consideration, it is enough to show that no deviation can occur on the
cooperation phase, i.e., (3.1) holds for x = (xI ; xS). By our assumption, x is supported by the grim-
trigger strategies under bankruptcy consideration. Therefore, each rm i does not have incentive
to switch its output from xi to any other, in particular to Bi(xj), in the presence of bankruptcy
constraints. If choosing Bi(xj) makes the rival rm to stay in the market, the incentive condition
remains identical to (3.1). If choosing Bi(xj) makes the rival to go bankrupt, the condition becomes
i(xi; xj)  (1  )i(Bi(xj); xj) + Mi > (1  )i(Bi(xj); xj) + Ci : (3.4)
The second inequality is satised since Mi > 
C
i . Thus, (3.1) must hold in both possible cases.
Proposition 2. Suppose demand is linear, marginal cost is constant and both rms are active at
the Cournot output. When   ; bankruptcy considerations do not change the collusive outcomes
that can be supported by grim-trigger strategies.
Proof. We have to show that, for   , (i) any x that can be supported (by the grim-trigger
strategies) under bankruptcy consideration can also be supported without the consideration, and
(ii) any x that can be supported without bankruptcy consideration can also be supported under
the consideration. Since (i) is already shown by Lemma (4) in general settings, we only need to
show (ii).
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The collusive outcomes that can be supported for a given  without the bankruptcy considera-
tions satisfy (3.1). For i = S, the following inequality holds.
S(xS ; xI)  (1  )S(BS(xI); xI) + CS : (3.5)
As we have shown, xI  xCI . Under bankruptcy considerations, we have to add the condition
that each rm does not have incentives to drive the other rm to bankruptcy. Since only rm S
possibly has those incentives, the condition that will prevent that deviation is,
S(xS ; xI)  (1  )S(x(xI); xI) + MS : (3.6)
Since   , at the Cournot output prole rm S does not have incentives to bankrupt rm I,
CS  (1  )S(x(xCI ); xCI ) + MS : (3.7)
Condition (3.5) can be rewritten as
S(xS ; xI)  (1  )S(BS(xI); xI)  (1  )CS + CS : (3.8)
Substituting (3.7) into (3.8),
S(xS ; xI)  (1  )S(BS(xI); xI)  (1  )CS + (1  )S(x(xCI ); xCI ) + MS ; (3.9)
which is also rewritten as
S(xS ; xI)  (1  )S(BS(xI); xI)  (1  )CS + (1  )S(x(xCI ); xCI ) (3.10)
  (1  )S(x(xI); xI) + (1  )(xS(xI); xI) + MS
= (1  )[(S(BS(xI); xI)  S(x(xI); xI))  (S(BS(xCI ); xCI )  S(x(xCI ); xCI ))]
+ (1  )S(x(xI); xI) + MS :
In order to derive (3.6), it is enough to show the third line in (3.10) is non-negative, that is,
S(BS(xI); xI)  S(x(xI); xI)  S(BS(xCI ); xCI )  S(x(xCI ); xCI ): (3.11)
Note that S(BS(xI); xI)   S(x(xI); xI) is decreasing in xI for all xI < xCI in the wide range of
situations, including the linear demand with constant marginal costs. Therefore, (3.11) holds under
our assumption.
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When  > ; the stationary Markov strategy xi = xCi ; i 2 fI; Sg in the state with all rms active,
and xi = xMi in states where only rm i is active is not a stationary Markovian Perfect Equilibrium
because rm S has incentives to bankrupt rm I: Thus, the Markovian Perfect equilibrium may
involve mixed strategies. We formally discuss this point at the end of this section. Before that, we
discuss rst the possibility of collusion in this case. In particular, consider all collusive outcomes
supported with grim-trigger strategies without bankruptcy considerations. In the next example we
show that none of those collusive outcomes can be supported as an SPNE because in all of them,
rm S have incentives to bankrupt rm I:
Example 1. Let p(X) = (a   xS   xI); a > 0; aI = a   cI = 5; aS = a   cS = 7;  = 0:3: Note
rst that  >  = 0:235 29: Let (xS ; xI) be an output prole satisfying (3.1). That is:
(7  xI   xS)xS  0:7(7  xI
2
)2 + 2:7; (3.12)
(5  xI   xS)xI  0:7(5  xS
2
)2 + 0:3 (3.13)
For  > ; at the Cournot output rm S has incentives to bankrupt rm I: We can see that at all
the output proles that satised (3.12) and (3.13), rm S has incentives to bankrupt rm I: That
is,
(7  xI   xS)xS < 1:4(5  xI) + 0:3(7
2
)2: (3.14)
In Figure 1 the area enclosed between the two solid lines corresponds to all the output proles
(xI ; xS) that satisfy (3.12) and (3.13). The area above the dash line corresponds to all the outputs
that satisfy (3.14). Note that for all (xI ; xS) that satisfy (3.12) and (3.13), rm S has incentives
to bankrupt rm I:4
4A similar example can be constructed with linear demand and cuadratic cost.
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As we have mentioned above, in what follows we discuss the properties of equilibrium when
 > : We start by a general observation that will be useful later on.
Lemma 5. For any pure strategy SPNE, no rm goes bankrupt.
Proof. Suppose that rm i goes bankrupt in some period t, which happens only if its prot in
t is negative. Since the prots after bankruptcy are always zero, the is continuation payo¤ at t is
zero. However, producing nothing at t and at any following periods, assures zero prots, so rm i
can protably deviate by choosing xti = 0 at t. Thus we derive contradiction.
Note that Lemma 5 holds even when strategies are not constrained to be Markovian. The
following lemma shows that when the repeated Cournot outcome cannot be an equilibrium, no
equilibrium in pure strategies exists when  is large.
Lemma 6. For any  > , there is no stationary Markov SPNE in pure strategies.
Proof. Given no bankruptcy occurs in an equilibrium in pure strategies (Lemma 5), the re-
peated Cournot outcome when both rms are active is a unique mutual best reply in pure strategies
that are Markovian. However, it cannot be an equilibrium for  >  by Lemma 3.
In light of Lemma 6, we study equilibria in mixed strategies when the innite repetition of the
Cournot output cannot be an equilibrium, i.e.,  > . The existence of a stationary Markovian
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equilibrium is guaranteed by an extension of a theorem proved in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)
which we leave in an appendix.
Proposition 3. For any , there exists at least one stationary Markovian equilibrium, possibly, in
mixed strategies.
Proof. See Appendix.
The characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium is not an easy task. We limit our study to
the characterization of the support of the mixed strategy. The details are developed in the Appendix
but we highlight here some of the properties. i) The support of each rms mixed strategy contains
exactly one interval with a unique mass point. Moreover, for each rm the mass point coincides
with the best reply of the static game (to the other rms mixed strategy). ii) The inferior rm
becomes bankrupt with positive probability (so monopolization occurs with positive probability).
There is only one output in its support in which the probability of bankruptcy is zero, namely
the inferior point of the support. As output increases, the probability of bankruptcy increases but
is never one. The mass point lies weakly above the interval. This reects that the possibility of
bankruptcy makes the inferior rm prudent when choosing outputs. iii) For the superior rm, the
mass point is isolated and lies strictly below the interval support. Since the superior rm would
not produce a larger output than the best reply unless bankruptcy occurs, outputs in the interval
support reect the predatory activities of the superior rm.
4. Equilibrium with Increasing Average Cost and Patient Firms
The folk theorem of repeated games states that when rms are su¢ ciently patient, arbitrary feasible
payo¤s larger than the minimax can be obtained as the average payo¤ of an SPNE of the repeated
game. Thus a natural question is to ask what kinds of payo¤s can be supported as an SPNE in our
model for su¢ ciently patient rms. This section is devoted to this task under Assumption 1 (see
Section 3). We concentrate here on pure-strategy equilibria.
We rst see that, for su¢ ciently patient rms ( close to one), any SPNE of the dynamic game
yields BF action proles in each period. This result is independent on both demand and costs
conditions. Denoting monopoly prots for rm i as Mi , we have the following:
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Proposition 4. Let ((x1S ; x
1
I); :::; (x
t
S ; x
t
I); ::::) be a sequence of output proles yielded by a SPNE
for a su¢ ciently large  and such that there is an  > 0 with i(xt) +   Mi for all t = 1; 2; :::;
i 2 fS; Ig. Then, when  ! 1; (xtS ; xtI) is BF for all t:
Proof. Suppose that in period t, (xtS ; x
t
I) is not BF: Thus, one rm can bankrupt the other.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the superior rm can bankrupt the inferior one. Consider
the following strategy for rm S. In period t; rm S produces an output ~xS that drives rm I into
bankruptcy, and produces the monopoly output thereafter. The continuation payo¤ for rm S is
(1  )(S(~xS ; xtI) + MS + 2MS + :::): (4.1)
The continuation payo¤ at t for the sequence ((x1S ; x
1
I); :::; (x
t
S ; x
t
I); :::) is:
(1  )(S(xt) + S(xt+1) + 2S(xt+2) + :::): (4.2)
By the denition of an SPNE,
S(x
t) + S(x
t+1) + 2S(x
t+2) + ::::  S(~xS ; xtI)) + MS + 2MS + ::: (4.3)
or
S(x
t) S(~xS ; xtI)  (MS  S(xt+1))+ 2(MS  S(xt+2))+ :::  + 2+ ::: = 

1   : (4.4)
Clearly, when  ! 1, the above inequality is impossible, contradicting that we were in an SPNE.
The condition that i(xt) +   Mi is satised, for instance, for stationary sequences. This
result shows that when rms are su¢ ciently patient, incentives for predation are high so rms only
choose BF allocations in equilibrium.5
In what follows we characterize the payo¤ that can be supported as a SPNE of the dynamic
game for su¢ ciently patient rms. For this purpose, we adapt the standard denition of a minimax
payo¤ to the case in which outputs are constrained to be BF.
Assumption 1 guarantees that the set of BF output proles is not empty and, as we have shown
in Lemma 2, is characterized as BF = f(xS ; xI)=0  xi  xi for i 2 fS; Igg; where x = (xS ; xI)
5This result can not be extended to n rms. The di¢ culty is that, after a rm is bankrupted, the strategies of
the surviving rms can be anything. An example of this is obtainable under request from the authors.
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with xi 6= 0 for all i 2 fS; Ig is such that i(x) = 0 for all i 2 fS; Ig: The minimax BF payo¤
for rm i is dened as:
im = min
xj2[0;xj ]
max
xi2[0;xi]
i(xi; xj) = max
xi2[0;xi]
i(xi; xj): (4.5)
Note that, since i(x) = 0; im > 0 because at (xi; xj) rm i by reducing his output gets
positive prots. The standard minimax, when applied to our model, yields a minimax payo¤ of
zero because rm j 6= i could produce an output, call it xj , such that the best reply of i is to
produce zero. But xj might not fulll the denition of minimax BF payo¤s because it might drive
rm j to bankruptcy.
In the following example we show the isoprots corresponding to the minimax BF payo¤.
Example 2. Let rm I be such that I(xI ; xS) = (10  xI   xS)xI   x2I ; and rm S be such that
S(xS ; xI) = (10 xS xI)xS  15x2S . In Figure 2, the intersection of the linear solid lines provides
(xI ; xS):The dash lines correspond to the best replies of the rms and the curve lines corresponds
to the minimax BF isoprots. Minimax outputs are those between the two isoprot corresponding
to minimax BF prots.
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The next proposition shows that, for a su¢ ciently large ; no SPNE of the dynamic game can
give any rm a payo¤ lower than its minimax BF payo¤.
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Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1, 0 2 (0; 1) exists such that for all  2 (0; 1), i < im
cannot be supported in any SPNE.
Proof. For each i 2 fS; Ig; let i 2 (0; 1) be such that iMi = im where Mi is the monopoly
prots for rm i and im is the minimax BF payo¤. Since Mi > im; 
i exists. Let 0 = maxi2N i
and let  2 (0; 1): Suppose that i < im is supported as an SPNE for  2 (0; 1): If xtj 2 [0; xj ]
for all t on and o¤ the equilibrium path, rm i could have achieved at least im irrespective of 
by choosing an output xti 2 [0; xi] (the standard argument in repeated games can be applied here
because in this case the output prole at each t is in the BF set). Therefore, if i < im happens
in equilibrium, xtj > xj must hold for some t either on or o¤ the equilibrium path. We show that if
this is the case, the continuation payo¤ for i at t in equilibrium; ti; must be such that 
t
i  Mi :
Suppose that ti < 
M
i ; since x
t
j > xj , rm i can make rm j bankrupt retaining non-negative
prots, and can achieve a monopoly prot in every period from t+ 1: Although the bankruptcy of
rm j has a cost at period t, the continuation payo¤ for rm i if it deviates from equilibrium will
be at least Mi : However, if 
M
i > 
t
i such a deviation would be protable for rm i and would
contradict the notion that we are in equilibrium. Therefore, ti  Mi : Since  2 (0; 1); ti > im:
Thus, i must exceed im which concludes the proof.
Note that when  is very small, rms may have little incentives to engage in predatory activities
and allocations which are not BF might be supported as an SPNE. For instance, if  = 0 only the
payo¤s corresponding to the Cournot equilibrium can be supported as an SPNE, but Cournot
equilibrium outputs may be not BF (see Figure 2).
We are now ready to prove a folk theorem regarding BF allocations. We say that i is an indi-
vidually rational BF payo¤ if i > im: An individually rational BF vector payo¤ (i)i2fS;Ig
is feasible if a BF output prole (xi; xj) exists such that i = i(xi; xj) for all i; j 2 fS; Ig; i 6= j:
In Figure 2 the BF output proles that give an individually rational BF payo¤ are the ones in the
area limited by the minimax BF isoprots.
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let  = (i)i2fS;Ig be a feasible and individually
rational BF payo¤ vector. Then, 0 2 (0; 1) exists such that for all  2 (0; 1),  is the average
payo¤s in some SPNE.
Proof. The proof is given by constructing an equilibrium which is originally proposed by
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). Let (i)i2fS;Ig be feasible and individually rational BF payo¤
18
vector. By the denition of feasibility, there is a BF output prole (xi; xj) such that i = i(xi; xj)
for i; j 2 fS; Ig; i 6= j:
Suppose each rm i 2 fS; Ig produces output xi in each period if no deviation has occurred,
but both i 2 fS; Ig produce xi, for T periods once one of them unilaterally deviates from the
equilibrium path. If no one deviates during these T periods, then rms go back to the original
path. Otherwise, if one of them deviates, then rms restart this phase for T more periods. We
prove that this strategy constitutes an SPNE.
First consider a deviation from the equilibrium path. Suppose rm i produces x0i 6= xi in some
period, say period t. By the one-stage-deviation principle (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.110),
a deviation is protable if and only if rm i could prot by deviating from the original strategy in
period t only and conforming thereafter. Therefore, rm i can benet by deviation if and only if
x0i exists such that
(1  )i(x0i; xj) + (1  )( + ::+ T )i(xi; xj) + T+1i > i; (4.6)
or equivalently,
(1  )i(x0i; xj) + T+1i > (1  )(1 +  + :::+ T )i + T+1i; (4.7)
which it holds whenever:
(1  )f(i(x0i; xj)  i)  ( + :::+ T )ig > 0: (4.8)
Let i = maxx0i i(x
0
i; xj)  i and choose T such that i < Ti. Note that the left hand side
of (4.8) is weakly less than (1  )fi  (+ :::+ T )ig. This term is non-positive when  is close
to 1. Therefore, (4.8) cannot be satised for such T .
By the same argument as above, rm i can benet by deviating from the mutual minmax phase
if and only if x00i exists such that
(1  )i(x00i ; xj) + (1  )( + :::+ T )i(xi; xj) + T+1i
> (1  )(1 +  + :::+ T 1)i(xi; xj) + Ti, (4.9)
which can be written as:
i(x
00
i ; xj) > 
Ti: (4.10)
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Note that i(x00i ; xj)  maxxi2[0;xi] i(xi; xj) = im: Since i > im by assumption, (4.10) never
holds when  is close to 1.
Thus there is no protable deviation when  is su¢ ciently close to 1. Since  is an arbitrary
feasible and individually rational BF payo¤ vector, the proof is complete.
5. Final Remarks
In this paper we have developed a theory of dynamic competition in which rms may bankrupt
other rms. We have shown that this theory provides new insights into the theory of dynamic
games. Cournot may not constitute a Markovian equilibrium. When this is the case, collusive
outcomes supported as an SPNE by grim-trigger strategies without bankruptcy considerations may
not be supported now, because in those outcomes, the superior rm have incentives to predate.
For su¢ ciently high  the Markov equilibrium involves mixed strategies and predation occurs with
positive probability. Finally, we have shown limit results, a folk theorem kind of result. Collusion
is more di¢ cult to sustain than in standard supergames and, in particular, not every individually
rational payo¤ can be supported by a SPNE.
Our results are obtained at the cost of making several simplifying assumptions to make the
model tractable. Here we discuss some of the issues arising from these simplications.
No accumulation
In this paper we focused on outputs that make other rms bankrupt, but we did not consider
the funds that might support or deter aggressive strategies (the "deep pocket" argument). Our
research strategy is to analyze the incentives to prey in the simplest possible case where no funds
can be accumulated. A full edged model of accumulation and predation is, no doubt about it,
preferable but it is beyond the scope of our paper. In other cases, accumulation of prots might play
an important role in shaping the SPNE set as in the model of Rosenthal and Rubinstein (1984).6
Credit
If credit is given on the basis of past performance, the redenition of the BF set can be applied
here and credits can be incorporated into the model. However, if credit is given on the basis of
6They characterize a subset of the Nash equilibria in the repeated game with no discounting (i.e.,  = 1) where
each player regards ruin of the other player as the best possible outcome and his own ruin as the worst possible
outcome.
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future performance, future performance also depends on credit (via the BF constraints), which
makes this problem extremely complex. This points to a deep conceptual problem about credit in
oligopolistic markets where rms might be made bankrupt. This topic should be the subject of
future research.
Entry
In this paper we assumed that the disappearance of a rm does not bring a new one into the
market. Of course this should not be taken literally. What we mean is that if entry does not
quickly follow, it makes sense, as a rst approximation, to analyze the model with a given number
of rms. For instance it can be shown that when rms are very patient and costs and demand are
linear, ruining a rm is a good investment even if monopoly lasts for one period. In other cases,
though, the nature of equilibria will be altered if, for instance, entry immediately follows the ruin
of a competitor as in the model of Rosenthal and Spady (1989).7
Buying Competitors
In our model, there is no option to buy a rm. Sometimes it is argued that buying an opponent
may be a cheaper and safer strategy than ruining it. We do not deny that buying competitors plays
an important role in business practices. However, we do not agree that under the option of buying,
ruining a competitor is irrational. First, buying competitors may be forbidden by a regulatory body
because of anticompetitive e¤ects. Second, when the owner of a rm sells it to competitors, this
does not stop her from creating a new rm and nancing it with the money received from selling the
old one. In other words, selling a rm is not equivalent to a contract in which the owner commits
not to enter into a market again. Thus, bankruptcy may be the only credible way of getting rid
of a competitor. Finally, buying and ruining competitors may complement each other because the
acquisition value may depend on the aggressiveness of the buyer in the past; see Burns (1986) for
some evidence in the American tobacco industry. Thus, it seems that a better understanding of
the mechanism of ruin might help to further enhancement of our understanding of how the buying
mechanism works in this case.
Summing up, the model presented in this paper sheds some light on certain aspects of the
equilibrium in oligopolistic markets in which rms may make each other bankrupt . We hope that
7They consider a prisoners dilemma in continuous time in a market with room for two rms only. When a rm
goes bankrupt, this rm is immediately replaced by a new entrant. They show that some kind of predatory behavior
can arise in equilibrium.
21
the insights obtained here can be used in further research in this area.
6. APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3. There are 4 possible states in our dynamic game, i.e., the set of active
rms is (i) S and I, (ii) S (iii) I, and (iv) empty. Note that continuation payo¤s in (ii) to (iv) can
be derived straightforwardly. Then, a stationary Markov SPNE of our dynamic game is identical
to a Nash equilibrium of a static game with the following payo¤ functions for each rm:
For all x such that i(x)  0 for all i 2 fS; Ig;
Vi(x) =
i(x)
1   i 2 fS; Ig; (6.1)
for all x such that i(x)  0 and j(x) < 0; i 6= j; i; j 2 fS; Ig;
Vj(x) = j(x); (6.2)
Vi(x) = i(x) +

1  
M
i ; (6.3)
for all x such that i(x) < 0 for all i 2 fS; Ig;
Vi(x) = i(x); i 2 fS; Ig: (6.4)
This game has discontinuous payo¤ functions so the usual existence theorems can not be applied
here. The discontinuities in our game arises because of the possibility of bankruptcy. When only
one rm goes bankrupt, the bankrupted rm disappears from the market and the other one gets
monopoly prots. Fortunately, Theorem 5b in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) (D&M hereinafter) can
be invoked to show the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Roughly speaking, the
existence of equilibrium is guaranteed when utility functions are bounded and continuous except
in a set of measure zero in the (joint) strategy space. More precisely, the theorem requires that (a)
discontinuities occur in a set whose dimension is strictly lower than the dimension of the strategy
space, (b) strategy sets are intervals, and (c) when we approach a discontinuity if a rm payo¤
falls, another rises. 8
8The original proof of D&M presumes that the set of points in which discontinuities occur is the main diagonal,
i.e., xS = xI . However, as the authors discuss in subsection 4.1, it is easy to verify that the essentially same proof
also holds as long as the dimensionality assumption is satised.
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To apply this theorem we need to construct an auxiliary game in which we disregard the
possibility that both rms go bankrupt. We will now show that this auxiliary game fullls the
conditions of Theorem 5b. The bankruptcy-free constraint of a rm i is p(xi + xj)  ACi(xi) and,
since demand is strictly decreasing (and average costs are non-decreasing), the discontinuity set for
a rm i is
A(i) = f(xi; xj) 2 R2+ j either xj = D(ACi(xi))  xi and j(xi; xj) > 0;
or xi = D(ACj(xj))  xj and i(xi; xj) > 0g; (6.5)
which is of lower dimension than the set of possible outputs which is a subset of R2+ with dimen-
sionality 2. For instance, under linear demand (p = a   x1   x2) and quadratic costs (ix2i ) the
set of outputs for which a discontinuity occurs for rm i is the intersection of the segment given by
a  xi   xj   ixi = 0 and a  xi   xj   jxj > 0, j 6= i:
Prots are bounded and continuous except in the aforementioned set, and at the discontinuity
point when the prot of a rm falls (because this rm is bankrupt) the prot of the other rm rises
(because it becomes a monopolist). Thus this auxiliary game fullls the conditions of Theorem 5b
in D&M and, therefore, it has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. The nal step is to show that the
Nash equilibrium of this auxiliary game is a Nash equilibrium of the original game. This is done
by realizing that no protable deviation exists in the original game from the Nash equilibrium of
the auxiliary game: for the superior rm because it will never bankrupt itself and for the inferior
rm because in order to bankrupt the superior rm it will become bankrupt itself.
Characterization of the support of the Markovian mixed strategy equilibrium.
In the rest of the appendix, we study the structure of the Markovian mixed strategy equilib-
rium which we simply call equilibrium.To characterize the equilibrium support, we impose two
assumptions.
Assumption AC The average cost for each rm is constant.
Let cS denote the average constant cost of the superior rm and cI the average constant cost
of the inferior rm, cS > cI :
Assumption EC Each rm is expected prot function (given other rms mixed strategy) is
strictly concave in xi for any xi > 0.
Let E[i(xi; xj) j j ] be expected prots of rm i, given that rm j is using the mixed strategy
j :
23
Assumption EC is often imposed in the IO literature, which holds under the wide range of
environments, such as linear cost functions with linear demand.
In order to characterize the support of the Markovian mixed strategy we need the following
auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 7. For any mixed strategy of the other rm, the optimal output that maximizes a rms
expected prot in a period (i.e. E[i(xi; xj) j j ]) is always unique.
Proof. From Assumption EC, argmaxxi>0E[i(xi; xj) j j ] is unique (if it exists), and is
optimal output is either argmaxxi>0E[i(xi; xj) j j ] or 0. Assumption AC implies that the
expected prot of the former is always positive, so it cannot be the case that both become optimal.
For constant marginal costs with linear demand, we can easily derive the optimal output as
follows. Firm is expected prot function (given js mixed strategy j) is
E[i(xi; xj) j j ] = E[(A  (xi + xj)  ci)xi j j ] (6.6)
= (A  (xi + E[xj ])  ci)xi;
which is a quadratic function of xi. Then, the optimal solution is derived by
xi = max

0;
A  ci
2
  E[xj ]
2

; (6.7)
which is clearly unique.
Lemma 8. Given  > , for any equilibrium in mixed strategies,
(i) at least one rm goes bankrupt with strictly positive probability,
(ii) no rm uses pure strategy.
Proof. (i) Since  > ; at least one rm is not using a pure strategy. Suppose without loss of
generality that is rm j and suppose that no rm goes bankrupt. Pick any two outputs x; x0 from
the support of the mixed strategy of rm j. Then, the rm must be indi¤erent between choosing x
and x0. However, given that no bankruptcy occurs, the rms optimal output (to the other rms
equilibrium strategy) is always unique by Lemma 7. Thus we get a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose on the contrary that rm i uses pure strategy xi (and j uses mixed strategy j). Then,
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rm j does not go bankrupt in equilibrium, since choosing such an output in the support of j is
clearly suboptimal. Let x < x0 be two di¤erent outputs in the support of j . Lemma 7 implies
that, in order for j to be indi¤erent between x and x0, bankruptcy must occur in either output.
Since i is decreasing in xj , i must go bankrupt under x0 but not under x. Moreover, the support
of j cannot contain a point other than x and x0 (since choosing such an output cannot yield the
same prot as x and x0 do). However, given that j randomizes only over the two points x and x0,
x must be best reply to xi, since bankruptcy does not occur in such case. Then, we can conclude
that either i or j has a protable deviation; j has incentive to set x0 as small as possible to make
i going bankrupt, but then i can avoid bankruptcy by slightly reducing xi. In this way, (xi; j)
cannot be a mutual best reply.
Let us denote smallest and largest outputs in the support of the equilibrium (mixed) strategy
for rm i by xi and xi, respectively. By Lemma 8 (ii), we have xi < xi for each i.
Lemma 9. In equilibrium, the following condition must hold for every rm i:
i(xi; xj) > 0:
Proof. Suppose i(xi; xj)  0. By choosing xi = xi, rm i always receives non-positive prot,
and strictly negative prot when xj > xj (note i(xi; xj) is decreasing in xj). Since the latter case
occurs with positive probability, i would always become strictly better o¤ by choosing xi = 0.
Lemma 10. In equilibrium, the following condition must hold for at least one rm:
i(xi; xj) > 0:
Proof. Suppose on contrary that i(xi; xj)  0 and j(xj ; xi)  0 hold simultaneously.
Combining with Lemma 9, the following inequalities must hold.
i(xi; xj) > 0 and j(xj ; xi)  0) ACi(xi) < p(xi + xj)  ACj(xj); (6.8)
j(xj ; xi) > 0 and i(xi; xj)  0) ACj(xj) < p(xj + xi)  ACi(xi): (6.9)
Since average costs are non-decreasing, the above conditions imply
p(xj + xi)  ACi(xi)  ACi(xi) < p(xi + xj); (6.10)
p(xi + xj)  ACj(xj)  ACj(xj) < p(xj + xi); (6.11)
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which further implies p(xi+ xj) < p(xj + xi) and p(xj + xi) < p(xi+ xj); which is a contradiction.
Lemma 11. If i(xi; xj) > 0 holds, then
(i) xi maximizes the expected per period prot given js mixed strategy, E[i(xi; xj) j j ];
(ii) xi must be isolated from other part of the support of is equilibrium strategy.
Proof. Since j(xj ; xi) > 0 by Lemma 9, js prot j(xj ; xi) is non-negative for any xj 2 [0; xj ].
This implies that probability such that j goes bankrupt is 0 when i chooses output su¢ ciently close
to xi. Therefore, (i) xi must be optimal given that no bankruptcy occurs, and (ii) no output close
to xi can be contained in is equilibrium support.
Lemma 12. In equilibrium, rm I never produces strictly higher output than the one which
maximizes its per period prot given rm Ss equilibrium mixed strategy. That is,
xI  argmax
xI
E[I(xI ; xS) j S ]:
Proof. Note rst that I can make S bankrupt only if I itself goes bankrupt. Hence, rm
I can never be better o¤ by bankrupting rm S. Choosing xI > xI weakly increases the risk of
bankruptcy and strictly reduces I in that period. Therefore, it must be suboptimal. (Note that I
makes S bankrupt only when I itself goes bankrupt.)
Lemma 13. The following conditions must hold:
(i) I(xI ; xS)  0:
(ii) S(xS ; xI) > 0:
Proof. We rst verify (i). Suppose on the contrary that I(xI ; xS) > 0 holds. Then,
by Lemma 11, I must choose a strictly larger output than argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ], which
contradicts Lemma 12. Given that (i) holds, (ii) must be satised by Lemma 10.
Lemma 14. Let x0S = argmaxxS E[S(xS ; xI) j I ]: The equilibrium support of rm Ss mixed
strategy is such that xS = x0S :
Proof. By Lemma 13, S(xS ; xI) > 0:Thus, by Lemma 11, xS maximizes Ss expected prot
(per period) given Is mixed strategy and it is an isolated point. Therefore, xS = x0S :
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Lemma 15. In equilibrium, rm I goes bankrupt with positive probability.
Proof. By Lemma 8 at least one rm goes bankrupt. If I does not go bankrupt then rm S is
bankrupt, but this is impossible because whenever rm S is bankrupt rm I is also bankrupt.
Lemma 16. For all xI in Ismixed strategy support, I(xI ; xS)  0:
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 13.
Lemma 17. In equilibrium:
(i) There is at most an ~xI in the support of Is mixed strategy such that the probability of
bankruptcy for rm I is zero.
(ii) If such ~xI exists, then ~xI = xI :
Proof. By Lemma 12, xI  argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ]: If there are two points with zero
probability of bankruptcy, ~x1I and ~x
2
I ; it should be the case that ~x
1
I < ~x
2
I < xI : But then, since
each rm is expected prot function (given other rms mixed strategy) is strictly concave in xi;
it could not be that the payo¤ of rm I is the same at ~x1I and at ~x
2
I : The proof of (ii) follows
immediately.
Lemma 18. The probability of bankruptcy for rm I at xI is zero.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that the probability that I goes bankrupt at xI is positive.
This probability is the probability that the superior rm produces xS 2 (~xS ; xS ]; for ~xS such that
p(xI + ~xS) = cI : By Lemma 9, I(xI ; xS) > 0; thus, ~xS 2 (xS ; xS ]: If ~xS is in the support of Ss
mixed strategy, rm S; by concentrating all the mass placed at [~xS + "; xS ] in ~xS + "; will not
change the probability of bankruptcy for rm I and will increase its per period payo¤. If ~xS is not
in the support of Ss mixed strategy, let x^S > ~xS be the closest point to ~xS in the support of Ss
mixed strategy. Again, rm S; by placing all the mass placed at [x^S ; xS ] in x^S ; will not change the
probability of bankruptcy for rm I and will increase its per period payo¤.
Lemma 19. If the support of rm Is mixed strategy contains an interval [xI ; xI
], then xI = xI ;
and there exists no other interval.
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Proof. Suppose that [xI ; xI
] is in the support and xI > xI : Then, by Lemma 17 the probability
of bankruptcy for rm I is positive at all xI 2 [xI ; xI]: Suppose without loss of generality that
[xI ; xI
] is the rst interval in the support. The argument in the proof of Lemma 18 can be
replicated here applied to xI : Thus, the probability of bankruptcy for rm I at x

I should be zero.
By Lemma 17 and 18, xI = xI : Therefore, it can not be another interval in the support.
Lemma 20. The support of Is mixed strategy contains exactly one interval.
Proof. By Lemma 19, if the support contains an interval, it must be unique. Suppose that
the support does not contains an interval. Since all rms are playing mixed strategies, the support
should contain at least two isolated mass points. Let these two points be x1I and x
2
I ; and assume
that x1I < x
2
I . At x
2
I rm I must go bankrupt with positive probability. Thus, I(x
2
I ; xS) < 0:
But this implies that probability that I goes bankrupt is unchanged for any xS 2 [xS   "; xS ]
for su¢ ciently small : However, if xS   " is in the support of Ss mixed strategy, S cannot be
indi¤erent over this interval since there is a unique optimal output by Lemma 7: If xS   " is not
in the support, it is a protable deviation for rm S; because choosing xS   " does not change the
probability of bankruptcy and gives a higher per period payo¤ (note xS = x0S < xS by Lemma 14).
Lemma 21. The equilibrium support of rm Ss mixed strategy contains at least one interval
[xS ; xS
].
Proof. Note that I contains an interval by Lemma 20 and xI  argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j
S ] by Lemma 12. Since Is per period prot is strictly increasing and also continuous in xI in
the interval, the probability of bankruptcy must be continuously increasing (in order for I to be
indi¤erent in the interval). This becomes possible only when S also contains an interval where
the distribution of xS does not jump.
Lemma 22. For any interval in the support of the rmsequilibrium mixed strategy, the following
must hold:
(i) I(xI ; xS
) = 0.
(ii) I(xI; xS) = 0
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Proof. (i) Lemma 18 implies I(xI ; xS
)  0: Since I(xI ; xS)  0 by Lemma 13, equality
must hold.
(ii) If I(xI; xS) < 0, then I(xI
; xS) < 0 must hold for any xS  xS . This implies that
probability such that I goes bankrupt is unchanged if I chooses xI from [xI ; xI] for su¢ ciently
small . However, I cannot be indi¤erent over this interval. Therefore, I(xI; xS)  0.
Now assume I(xI; xS) > 0: Suppose rst that there is no isolated (mass) points in the support
of Is mixed strategy. By Lemma 20 the support of Is mixed strategy contains exactly one interval,
then, I(xI; xS) > 0 implies that I(xI ; x

S) > 0 for any xI 2 [xI ; xI]: Thus, the probability that
I goes bankrupt is unchanged if S chooses xS from [xS ; x

S + "] for su¢ ciently small . But if this
is the case, S cannot be indi¤erent over this interval.
If there is an isolated point in the support of Is mixed strategy, by Lemmas 19 and 20, the largest
output in Is support, xI ; has to be the one. Suppose that I(xI ; xS)  0; then I(xI ; xS) > 0 for
all xI < xI in Is support. Then for " su¢ ciently small, for any xS 2 [xS ; xS + "] the probability of
bankruptcy for rm I is zero. But if this is the case, rm S can not be indi¤erent in the interval
[xS ; x

S + "]: Consequently, I(xI ; x

S) < 0: Since we assume I(xI
; xS) > 0, when rm S produces
xS the probability of bankruptcy for rm I is the probability that I produces xI : By producing
xS+" the probability of bankruptcy for I does not change. But in this case, S can not be indi¤erent
among the outputs in [xS ; x

S + "]: Thus I(xI
; xS) = 0.
Lemma 23. In equilibrium, the support of each rm strategy contains exactly one interval.
Proof. The property in Lemma 22 cannot hold if a rm has more than one (disjoint) interval.
By Lemma 21 and 20, we obtain the result.
Lemma 24. The interval in the equilibrium support of rm S cannot contain xS :
Proof. First, note that our argument so far has not concluded whether the interval is open or
closed, i.e., endpoints are contained within the support or not. The lemma claims that the smaller
endpoint of Ss interval is not contained.
Suppose that xS is included in the support. If Is support does not contain an isolated mass
point, when rm S produces xS the probability of bankruptcy for rm I is zero because by Lemma
22, I(xI; xS) = 0: Then, at x
0
S (the isolated point in Ss support which is the smallest output in
the support), I(xI ; x0S)  0 for all xI in Is support. Thus, by producing x0S rm S cannot bankrupt
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rm I: But in this case, rm S cannot be indi¤erent between x0S and x

S : If Is support contains
an isolated point, xI ; by producing xS the probability that I goes bankrupt is the probability that
I produces xI because by Lemma 22, I(xI; xS) = 0: But then at x

S   " for " su¢ ciently small,
the probability of bankruptcy for rm I will not change and rm S will be better o¤ because
x0S < x

S   " < xS .
Lemma 25. Let x0I = argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ]; Then, the following must hold:
(i) xI = x0I :
(ii) I(x0I ; x
0
S) > 0:
Proof. (i) Suppose that xI < argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ]: By Lemma 22, I(xI ; xS)  0
(either because there is no isolated points in Is support and therefore xI = xI and I(xI ; xS) = 0;
or there are isolated points and then xI is an isolated point and I(xI ; xS) < 0): Then I(xI ; xS) < 0
for all xS 2 (xS ; xS]; and by Lemmas 9 and 14 I(xI ; x0S) > 0: Thus, the probability of I being
bankrupt when producing xI is the probability that rm S produces xS 2 (xS ; xS]: Take xI = xI+"
with " su¢ ciently small, then I(xI ; x0S) > 0; and I(xI ; x

S) < 0: Therefore I(xI ; xS) < 0 for all
xS 2 (xS ; xS]: Thus, the probability of I being bankrupt at xI is the same that at xI . Given that
xI < xI  argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ], the one period payo¤ at xI is higher and rm I would be
better o¤ at xI than at xI : Thus, xI = x0I :
(ii) By (i) and Lemmas 9 and 14, I(xI ; xS) = I(x0I ; x
0
S) > 0
Lemma 26. If rm I has an isolated point in its support it has to be x0I ; and in this case, the
interval in the equilibrium support of rm I has to exclude xI:
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 25 that if there is an isolated point, x0I must be isolated.
Suppose that in this case, xI is in the support. By Lemma 22 I(xI; xS) = 0; thus, the probability
of bankruptcy for I when producing xI is the probability that S produces xS 2 (xS ; xS]: But
given that I(x0I ; x
0
S) > 0 by Lemma 25 (ii), the probability of bankruptcy for I when producing
x0I is also the probability that S produces xS 2 (xS ; xS]: But if this is the case; I can not be
indi¤erent between x0I and xI
: Therefore, xI can not be in the support.
Summarizing we have the following characteristics of the equilibrium strategy support for each
rm.
30
Proposition 7. Every equilibrium must satisfy the following conditions:
(i) Firm S randomizes over x0S [ (xS ; xS] where x0S < xS :
(ii) Firm I randomizes over [xI ; xI
) [ x0I where xI  x0I :
(iii) x0I = argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ].
(iv) The probability of bankruptcy for rm I is positive at every xI in the support except at xI :
(v) x0S = argmaxxS E[S(xI ; qS) j I ].
(vi) I(xI ; xS
) = 0.
(vii) I(xI; xS) = 0.
(viii) I(x0I ; x
0
S) > 0:
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